Indentured immigration was a trans-Atlantic market in forward-labor contracts. Forward contracting distinguished this market from other forms of long-term contracting. .The important issue in forward contracting is how well it conforms to the efficient-market hypothesis, or how well future values are estimated and how efficiently the value of information is arbitraged when negotiating the initial contract. The analysis that follows will model and test whether the market for indentured immigrants conformed to the efficient-market hypothesis.
Previous economic studies of colonial indentured immigration have ignored the issues of forward contracting and efficient forecasting and instead have favored use of the market to evaluate human capital. For example, Robert Heavner analyzed the auction of servants after they arrived in Philadelphia and used the variance in contract prices as the sole measure of differences in servant human capital.4 He modeled indentured immigration as a spot market and ignored the effect that competitive recruiting of servants in Europe would have on their subsequent colonial prices.5
By contrast, David Galenson analyzed recruitment of indentured servants in England and used the variance in contract lengths negotiated prior to sailing as the primary measure of differences in servant human capital.6 He assumed that recruiters in Europe competed away all expected contract price differences in the colonies by altering the contract terms offered servants, principally the amount of service time, until their expected colonial value just equaled their shipping cost. The 5 Heavner applied his model to redemptioner rather than to indentured servants which makes his results difficult to interpret. His evidence was for German immigrant servants who used the redemptioner method exclusively. Under this method the immigrant contracted a fixed debt for passage in Europe and promised to sell himself in America, if necessary, to repay the given loan. The redemptioner entered the colonial auction with a fixed price and bargained over the time he would have to serve to repay his debt. The procedure was the opposite of the colonial auction in which an indentured immigrant had a contract of fixed length sold for the highest bid. Therefore, Heavner's regression, when applied to redemptioner evidence was incorrectly specified because he treated the price as the dependent variable and the contract length as an independent variable. For more detail see Grubb, "Redemptioner Servants. shipping cost was assumed to be constant across servants, therefore, the expected colonial price would be constant across servants.
In effect, Galenson invoked the efficient-market hypothesis to assume that colonial auction prices had no additional information with respect to measuring human capital, and he used this to justify the absence of contract prices in his regression analysis. However, if recruiters in Europe did not forecast the future colonial prices of their servants with perfect efficiency, then the relationship between contract length and the value of servant human capital would be broken. Therefore, Galenson's conclusions depend critically on how well the market conformed to the efficient-market hypothesis.
At first glance, evidence on contract prices in the colonies does not support the efficient arbitrage of all price differences. For example, indentured immigrant prices in Philadelphia, the largest and most developed servant market in eighteenth-century North America, exhibited considerable variance, see Table 1 . The standard error in prices was around 16 to 22 percent of the mean price, and female prices were below male prices. The price distribution was similar to that of contract lengths, suggesting that price variance was as important as contract length variance in explaining servant values.
However, the evidence also suggests that indentured immigration was not a spot market and that competitive recruiting in Europe had some effect on subsequent colonial prices. The positive relationship between service time and contract price, expected in a spot market, was not very evident. The correlation coefficient between contract price and length was -.06 in the 1745 sample and .25 in the 1771 to 1773 sample. Secondly, 15 Pennsylvania pounds equalled about 8.6 pounds sterling in 1745 and 9.3 pounds sterling in 1772.8 The range encompassed the costs incurred in recruiting, equipping, and transporting servants.9 This finding suggests excessive profits may have been competed away in the recruiting process.' (Chapel Hill, 1978 1966), pp. 86-87. The freight cost was around 3.5 to 6 pounds sterling. Adding in recruiting and equipping costs could raise the amount to 10 or 12 pounds sterling. These estimates of shipping costs may not include returns to uncertainty or risk caused by servant default due to death or disease which could cause the estimated cost of shipping servants to increase even more.
'0 Profits in the indentured immigrant trade can not be directly estimated with this evidence because the cost of shipping servants was not recorded and the risk of servant default through death, disease, and escape is unknown. For a systematic effort to estimate the profits from shipping redemptioner servants see Farley Grubb, "Risk and the Rate of Return to Financing the Immigration of German Servants to Philadelphia," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Economic History Association, Sept. 1985 (mimeo). Although Table I The presence of substantial risks for merchants speculating in forward-labor contracts does not imply that the market was inefficient. Risks were information costs that affected decisions just like any other cost. The presence of risks makes measuring the efficiency of the market difficult. A model of indentured immigration must separate predictable from unpredictable sources of price variance to measure the degree to which the market conformed to the efficient-market hypothesis. Such a procedure will also help determine whether the variance in contract prices or contract lengths best measured the differences in servant human capital.
The evidence used to test the model was taken from the indentured 
THE MODEL OF INDENTURED IMMIGRATION
Indentured immigration is modeled as a competitive trans-Atlantic market for forward-labor contracts. 15 The first half of the model, outlined in Table 2 Sources: See Table 1. variables, their construction, and the regression results are given in Table 3 . At the time of contract formation in Europe recruiters would have information on the first fifteen and possibly the first nineteen variables listed in Table 3 . The first seven were negotiated contract parameters: the discounted contract length, the provision of training or employment at a skilled trade, adjustments to the dues paid at the end of the contract, and who would be selling the servant. The second eight were observed servant characteristics and circumstances: gender, marital status, and time of arrival. The last four were the ports of departure.
The age, physique, and perceived health of the servants, important to determining their expected colonial value and observed by recruiters in Europe, were not recorded by the civil authorities. These variables, however, were embodied in the contract parameters, principally the length. It was through adjusting the contract length that recruiters arbitraged the value of this information. Therefore, the contract length serves as a proxy for age, physique, and any other observable servant characteristics not directly controlled in Table 3.19 The market was relatively efficient in arbitraging profitable information known at the time of servant recruitment in Europe. The amount of contract price variance explained by all the variables in Table 3 was small, 13 percent for the 1745 sample and 28 percent for the 1771 to 1773 sample. And the variables representing information known at the time ' The rate assumed to discount all contracts was 25 percent; the results proved to be relatively invariant to rates ranging from 5 to 50 percent. The proper discount rate was not obvious. Other studies have simply assumed a rate without much justification. For example, the Galenson studies, see fn. 6, implicitly assumed a zero discount rate, and Heavner, "Indentured Servitude," pp. 73-75, assumed a 15 percent discount rate. A crude measure of the discount rate of new immigrant servant contracts was derived by comparing the average price to the contract-length ratio between resident and new immigrant servants. The measure assumed that the average price to length ratio should be constant across similar servants; any differences would therefore generate a residual discount rate: (CPRITR) = (CPIITI)I(l + r)TI-TR Where: CPR = average resident servant prices CPI = average immigrant servant prices TR = average resident contract lengths TI = average immigrant contract lengths r = discount rate Applying the formula to the evidence cited in Table 1 yielded a discount rate of 25 percent, independent of the group of resident servants: resold immigrant contracts, local residents who voluntarily entered service, or local residents forced into service by debt. The values of immigrant contracts were discounted relative to resident servant contracts for several reasons: immigrants experienced higher morbidity and mortality, took longer to adapt to the new tasks required of them in the New World, and may have been more likely to run away because most of the contract's compensation was already paid in the form of passage to the colonies. If the 25 percent was a risk premium, then the appropriate rate would be 25 percent plus the market rate. But because the 25 percent may also capture some real productivity differences between labor in the first year and subsequent years of the contract, the 25 percent rate was used as a best guess. of recruitment, the major contract parameters, servant characteristics, and market conditions listed in the first fifteen variables in Table 3 , explained only about 2 percent of the variance in contract prices. As a group, these fifteen variables were jointly insignificant.20 In addition, the rather large and unexplained residual variance in contract prices was relatively random over the chronological order of contract sales, as observed in the residual plots and measured by the Durbin-Watson statistic. Thus most of the realized fluctuations in contract prices appears to be unrelated to conditions known at the time of contract formation because the price differences relating to these conditions were arbitraged away in the competitive recruitment process.
On the individual level, recruiters in the 1745 sample completely arbitraged away the value of information pertaining to servant training, extra freedom dues, who would be the sales agent, the order of sale within the seasonal market, and the other information embodied in the contract length, such as age, physique, and health. Recruiters in the 1771 to 1773 sample completely arbitraged away the value of information pertaining to extra freedom dues, who would be the sales agent, and the seasonal and yearly pattern of prices.
The nature of the arbitrage process was apparent in several cases. For example, recruiters expected contracts associated with occupational training to have a relatively lower colonial value. Therefore, they negotiated these contracts to be 21.3 percent longer on average. The extra service time just offset the trainees' lower value, and their contracts sold for the same price as other contracts.2' Therefore, merchants were fully compensated and were indifferent to shipping these less-productive servants.
Another Table 3 . This variable was not used in the 1771-1773 sample because this market had many other redemptioner Irish servants will be very dull sale such numbers have already arrived from Different ports & many more expected, that I believe it will be over done, especially as several Dutch vessels are expected here, which will always command the Market. Captain Power I believe has near sold all his, he being pretty early.23
Merchants arriving late in the seasonal market carried servants with contracts 4 percent longer on average than those delivered earlier in the season. The adjustment was apparently enough to maintain a constant price over each seasonal market.
Recruiters expected servants arriving in the main fall market to be less valuable than servants arriving in the spring market. Spring arrivals were offered shorter contracts than fall arrivals. In the 1745 sample spring contracts were 3.3 percent shorter; for 1771 to 1773 they were 8.3 percent shorter. Fall was the only season when German servants arrived in great numbers. Relatively longer contracts offered British servants arriving in the fall may have been compensation for merchants having to sell in a more competitive seasonal market.24 However, this adjustment was not enough to arbitrage seasonal price differences completely in the 1745 sample in which spring arrivals sold for prices 8 percent higher than fall arrivals. But by the 1771 to 1773 sample the increased lengthening of fall contracts relative to spring contracts had completely arbitraged away the seasonal price difference.
In females to be relatively more valuable.27 The modest narrowing of the male-to-female price differential between the 1745 and 1771 to 1773 samples was accomplished by lengthening female contracts relative to males by 10.4 percent between the two periods. The difficulty in forecasting the difference in market value between males and females in both samples may explain the occasional advice merchants sent to their European recruiters to "send no more women.' 28 There were several minor deviations from perfectly efficient forecasting.29 For example, the adjustment to contract length in the 1771 to 1773 sample was incomplete. A one-year increase in service time, from four to five years, raised the contract price by 5 percent. In response to the observed age, physique, or health of the servant, for which the contract length served as a proxy in Table 3 , recruiters slightly overcompensated for below-average servants by excessively lengthening their contracts.
Finally, the price variance relating to different ports of departure in the 1771 to 1773 sample may have represented an additional, but minor, source of forecast error. However, because the cost of delivery and the market structure of recruiting may not have been constant across these ports, the interpretation of these regression results must remain speculative. The reference port was Dublin, and servants from Irish ports both north and south of Dublin sold for 3.3 percent less, whereas servants from London sold for 10 percent more, and servants from Bristol sold for 20 percent more than Dublin servants.30 Different shipping costs, as measured by the sailing distances to Philadelphia, could not explain all estimated price differences. Contracts for Bristol servants were 15.8 percent longer on average than those for servants from Dublin or London, and because Bristol servants were sold for prices above London servants, recruiters in Bristol may have underestimated the relative value of their servants. Ulster servants had 7.3 percent shorter contracts, and servants from South Ireland had 4.1 percent longer contracts than Dublin servants. Prices for both 27 The difference between male and female contract lengths was the same as found by Galenson, White Servitude, p. 104, for English servants leaving London between 1718 and 1759. Either the relative value of male versus female servants was changing by 1745, at least in the Philadelphia market, or recruiters had overestimated the relative value of females for some time. 29 For example, prices for married servants were 10 percent lower, and prices for those with trade skills were 22 percent higher, than the 1771-1773 average. By waiving the right to freedom dues, a lower price of over 50 percent resulted in the 1745 sample. However, these cases only accounted for 14 contracts out of 1,338 and so are of minor importance. The difficulty in forecasting the value of some of these infrequently-used contract stipulations may explain why servants who wanted these conditions tended to opt for the redemptioner contract form. See Grubb, "Redemptioner Servants." 30 The Bristol coefficient was significantly different from the London coefficient in Table 3 
CONCLUSIONS
Merchants transporting indentured servants from Europe to America were speculating in forward-labor contracts. They guaranteed the contract terms to the servant before sailing and then sold the contract in the colonies at auction. Merchants had to forecast the colonial price of each contract to successfully compete for servants in Europe. Separating predictable from unpredictable sources of price variance indicates that recruiters used information known at the time of recruitment with relative efficiency. They successfully arbitraged known profit opportunities relating to expected differences in colonial servant values. The minor areas of forecast error were between males and females, on a few infrequently-used contract stipulations, and across different ports of emigration. Recruiters slightly overestimated the relative value of female, Ulster, Bristol, and married servants. And they slightly underestimated the relative value of skilled and South Irish servants. The large variance in colonial auction prices was predominantly related to unforeseeable events that occurred after the voyage had begun. Thus the variance in contract parameters, principally contract length, was the best measure of permanent differences in servant human capital. And the variance in contract prices was the best measure of unexpected changes in servant values induced by events such as a traumatic voyage. The degree to which the trans-Atlantic labor market conformed to the efficient-market hypothesis, given the substantial level of risk and uncertainty, is suggestive of the general performance of American colonial markets.
